This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The SMM recorded four ceasefire violations in the wider area of Donetsk airport and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
Positioned at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation post at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk), between 8:16 and 9:59hrs, the SMM observed four ceasefire violations. The SMM also recorded some kinetic activity close to government-controlled Andriivka (41km north-east of Mariupol). In Luhansk region the SMM did not register any ceasefire violations.
The SMM followed up on allegations of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) shelling on 17 November in the area between government-controlled Zoriane (30km north-west of Donetsk) and government-controlled Kurakhivka (32km west of Donetsk). The impact crater location was 400m from residential buildings; the SMM did not observe material damage to the buildings. The SMM was unable to conduct comprehensive crater analysis, because the crater had been tampered with (by the local police, according to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and local residents) and affected by the weather conditions, but saw the remnants of a rocket in the crater. The SMM assessed that the rocket was launched by an MLRS, but could not determine the type. In the SMM’s assessment, the crater was over a week old, which was confirmed by local residents.
At a checkpoint near “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk) armed men told the SMM that an armed “LPR” member (male, 24) had been injured by a mine explosion during demining activities in Sokilnyky on 19 November. The surgeon at the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) confirmed this to the SMM.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces and “DPR” permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. The SMM noted that eight weapons were missing from the Ukrainian Armed Forces sites, and it was denied access to one site*. At the “DPR” permanent weapons storage sites all previously recorded weapons were present. However, in one of the sites the SMM noted the presence of anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira 100mm), which are heavy weapons that fall outside the scope of the Addendum and their presence at the site is in violation of the weapons’ respective withdrawal lines.
In other areas beyond the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed the following Addendum-proscribed weapons: one main battle tank (MBT; T64) near the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) training area and 20 MBTs within that training area.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal and movement of heavy weapons. Neither “DPR” nor “LPR” members have yet provided the requested inventories or locations of designated permanent storage sites for these weapons as requested by the SMM on 16 October. The Ukrainian military authorities have also as of yet to provide such information. Nonetheless, the SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though these did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.
At a Ukrainian Armed Forces holding area, the SMM observed 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika 122mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya 152mm) and noted six self-propelled howitzers missing (four 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm and two 2S3 Akatsiya 152mm).
In addition, the SMM observed seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) stationary along the roadside near the “LPR” training area in Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk), which is beyond the withdrawal lines as well as one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) within that training area. No weapons were observed at a known training area near “LPR”-controlled-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), where the SMM had previously observed eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika 122mm) and eight towed howitzers (D30, 122mm).
Close to the contact line, the SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles spotted six infantry fighting vehicles (four BMD, two BMP) in the area of government-controlled Krasnohorivka (22km north-west of Donetsk).
The SMM facilitated and monitored demining and repair works between “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and nearby government-controlled Artemove. Deminers cleared a further 170m stretch along the route of the power line that is to be repaired. The SMM also facilitated and monitored repair works on power lines on both the government-controlled and the “LPR”-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) bridge. The SMM followed up on the status of repair works of the water pump station in “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk) and was informed by the duty officer that it is still inoperable due to missing spare parts (see SMM Daily Report 30 October 2015).
The SMM monitored the humanitarian situation close to the contact line. In “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM spoke with a female resident (middle-aged), who said the village was affected by unreliable power and water supply, residents had difficulties buying coal and humanitarian aid was not delivered regularly. She added that some 150 people lived in the village, including 20 children who could not attend school since there was none in the village and there was no transport to take the children to a nearby village where they used to go to school.
The SMM followed up on reports of explosions damaging power supply pylons and subsequent disruption of power supply across the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea. In Chaplynka (70km south-east of Kherson), the SMM observed damage to three power supply pylons: one, mainly supplying the “Titan” plant (located on the Crimea peninsula) had collapsed, while two other pylons nearby were damaged, but still operational. The SMM also observed “Crimean blockade” activists, represented by Crimean Tatars, Right Sector, Aidar volunteer battalion under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Avtomaidan Kyiv, guarding the site, which is located in an agricultural field. The SMM spoke with the “chief of staff” of the “Crimea blockade”, an ethnic Crimean Tatar, who stated that the activists did not take responsibility for the damage to the power lines, but would guard the site in order to prevent repairs. He referred to this undertaking as the beginning of an “electricity blockade”. The regional police report indicated that one such pylon was similarly damaged in the area of Chonhar (160km south-east of Kherson). The SMM obtained a statement by the Ministry of Energy, which detailed the extent of the damage and the contingency supply routes, but noted that only up to 650MW of power can be supplied to Crimea (according to the Ministry, demand is estimated at 900-950MW). The statement noted that the power supply grid was vulnerable under these circumstances and any further damage (e.g. by adverse weather conditions) could leave up to 40% of residents in Kherson and Mykolaiv regions without electricity and completely stop supply to the Crimean peninsula.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.
Denial of access:
- Armed “DPR” members denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near the exit of “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (18km west of Donetsk) in the direction of Krasnohorivka, citing security concerns. The SMM observed hazard signs in the vicinity of the checkpoint (boards with “Mines” in Cyrillic).
- Armed “LPR” members denied the SMM access to Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), citing security concerns related to on-going demining work in the village.
- Armed men denied the SMM access to Sokilnyky village a second time later that day.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a permanent storage site without providing an explanation.
 All times are in Kyiv time unless otherwise specified.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.
 For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.