This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a significant increase in ceasefire violations. Live-fire training continued in close proximity to the contact line, on both sides of it.
From its position at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk) observation point, the SMM recorded a significant number of ceasefire violations, including 206 undetermined explosions and over 76 bursts of outgoing small-arms fire. In addition, between 11:06 and 11:34hrs, the SMM heard some 26 explosions that it assessed as either main battle tank (MBT) or heavy artillery (100mm or higher calibre) fire – weapons that are restricted in this proximity of the contact line. Most of the ceasefire violations were heard at locations ranging from 3km to 10km to the north-west, north, north-east, and south-west. When the SMM left the observation point at 15:00hrs, the exchange of fire across the contact line continued. Near government-controlled Avdiivka (15km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard several bursts of outgoing small arms and light weapons (SALW), and in the government-controlled side of Zaitseve (49km north of Donetsk) it heard two explosions consistent with incoming 82mm mortar fire.
In Luhansk region, the SMM observed over a four-hour period continuous live-fire training some 2km east of “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Oleksiivka (33km south-west of Luhansk). The SMM heard explosions consistent with the use of heavy artillery – which is restricted in this area – and mortars, as well as SALW. The SMM also heard repeated bursts of heavy machine gun from the direction of a known training area over 2km north-west of government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).
The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) announced that both Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” had conducted live-fire exercises, some of which the SMM observed and were very close to the contact line: near the government-controlled Dmytrivka (43km north-west of Luhansk, 20km from the contact line) and Trokhizbenka (4km from the contact line), as well as near “LPR”-controlled Lyman (11km north of Luhansk, 5km from the contact line) and Oleksandrivsk (9km west of Luhansk, 10km from the contact line).
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited one Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines. All previously recorded weapons were present, their quantity and serial numbers matching the inventory.
In violation of the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed a trailer carrying an MBT (T-64) moving south-east from government-controlled Teple (31km north-east of Luhansk). In areas beyond the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed nine MBTs (T-64) near government-controlled Starobilsk (83km north-west of Luhansk), and 12 MBTs at a training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal and movement of heavy weapons. Neither “DPR” members, nor “LPR” members have yet provided the requested inventory or locations of designated permanent storage sites for these weapons as requested by the SMM on 16 October. The Ukrainian military authorities have also as of yet to provide such information. Nonetheless, the SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though these did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.
In government-controlled areas, the SMM revisited one such holding area and observed that all previously recorded 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM revisited one holding area and observed the presence of six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).
In violation of the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed in “LPR”-controlled Oleksiivka 11 towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm), located in a training area. In areas beyond the withdrawal lines, the SMM spotted eight howitzers (D-30) in a training area near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM monitored the movement of other military hardware. It observed a convoy of 13 Kamaz and Ural trucks driving west towards “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk). In the vicinity of “LPR”-controlled Novosvitlivka (17km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a convoy of 30 Kamaz trucks moving north-west. An “LPR” “police” car escorted the trucks, which were covered.
In “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (37km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM facilitated and observed demining and then the repair works on power lines in the area between Horlivka and government-controlled Artemove (40km north-east of Donetsk). Another SMM patrol monitored both the ceasefire and repair works across the contact line, near government-controlled Dzerzhynsk (43km north of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the SMM facilitated and monitored repair works on power lines near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, in the area between the “Prince Igor” monument and Siverskyi Donets River. An “LPR” demining unit cleared the area prior to the repair works, which lasted for five and a half hours.
In government-controlled Selydove (41km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM followed up on reports regarding casualties among Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel. The Ukrainian Armed Forces interlocutors had told the SMM previously that eight soldiers had been wounded and one killed in action near government-controlled Vodiane (16km north-west of Donetsk) on 14 November. The SMM met three military doctors who stated that two of the wounded soldiers had been transported to a hospital in Krasnoarmiisk (54km north-west of Donetsk) and another four to Dnepropetrovsk. At Krasnoarmiisk hospital, the SMM met the head doctor, who confirmed the account of the doctors from Selydove, adding that the two soldiers they had received had been moved to Dnepropetrovsk for further treatment.
The SMM followed up on information about a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier who reportedly had been wounded in the vicinity of government-controlled Orikhove-Donetske (43km north-west of Luhansk). At the hospital in government-controlled Novoaidar (43km north-west of Luhansk), the chief surgeon told the SMM a soldier had been admitted with bullet wounds to his stomach and hand. Following a surgery he had been transferred to Kharkiv.
At the pedestrian border crossing point between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in “LPR”-controlled Sievero-Hundorivskyi (49km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed approximately 50 parked civilian cars, most of which had Ukrainian registration plates with “LPR” stickers, while a few had Russian registration plates. The “LPR” armed individuals at the crossing point told the SMM that these cars were being left by civilians who crossed into the Russian Federation by foot. The SMM monitored the flow of pedestrians (mixed gender), crossing into Ukraine from the Russian Federation and carrying various goods.
The SMM observed impediments to the movement of civilians across the contact line. At a checkpoint in government-controlled Zaitseve (49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a queue of approximately 350 vehicles waiting to cross into “DPR”-controlled areas and some 80 cars waiting to cross in the opposite direction. The SMM noted a similar situation at a checkpoint near government-controlled Heorhiivka (27km south-west of Donetsk), where approximately 300 civilian cars were queuing to cross into “DPR”-controlled areas and some 140 civilian cars were heading to the opposite side. At a checkpoint near government-controlled Marinka (24km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM witnessed a 2km-long queue of about 380 civilian vehicles and six buses waiting to enter government-controlled areas and some 30 civilian vehicles on the opposite side of the checkpoint. The majority of the cars at the Marinka checkpoint had Ukrainian registration plates.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.
Denial of access:
- On 17 November the SMM received a letter from the “LPR” demanding the removal of two SMM monitors from “LPR”-controlled areas, despite OSCE Permanent Council Decision 1117, which establishes their right and obligation to monitor and report throughout Ukraine. The two monitors had visited the hospital in Luhansk city to follow up on and establish the facts in relation to reports of casualties among “LPR” members as a result of armed clashes at the line of contact.
- Four armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM approximately 200m from a training area near Oleksiivka, confirming training was conducted and denying the SMM further access. The SMM left the area after five minutes.
- A civilian car with Russian plate numbers and two armed “LPR” members overtook the SMM on the way to Velykyi Sukhodil (46km south-east of Luhansk), and motioned it to stop; they requested the SMM patrol plan, which they checked before permitting the SMM to continue its movement.
- Consequently, as the SMM approached Sievero-Hundorivskyi (49km south-east of Luhansk), another group of “LPR” armed members stopped the SMM, and one of the armed individuals introduced himself as the “commander of the border guard unit” in Sievero-Hundorivskyi. The interlocutor seemed aware of the SMM’s route and patrol purpose, and insisted that the SMM would be escorted to the crossing point.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.
 For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
 All times are in Kyiv time unless otherwise specified.