Briefing of diplomatic correspondents by Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Alexandros Papaioannou (19.10.2021)

AL. PAPAIOANNOU: Good morning, I’m glad to see you again.
Unfortunately, I was in Washington D.C. last week, so it was not possible to hold our regular briefing.

As I will also be away tomorrow, that’s why we are holding the briefing today, Tuesday.
Let’s get straight to the point.

Last week, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was in Washington D.C., where he met with his US counterpart, Antony Blinken.

As you know, immediately after the bilateral meeting, the two Ministers jointly launched the third round of the Greece-US Strategic Dialogue.

They then signed the second protocol of Amendment to the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA).

On the sidelines of the above meeting, the Minister also had a brief meeting with the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Karen Donfried.

During his stay in Washington D.C., Mr. Dendias also met with members of Congress, such as Senator Chris Van Hollen, and Congressmen Ted Deutch and John Sarbanes.
He also had separate meetings with his Israeli counterpart Yair Lapid and his Emirati counterpart Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

Let me elaborate on the aforementioned issues.

First of all, let’s see what is new about the renewal of the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA).

This agreement confirms, from the part of the USA, the strategic and stabilizing role of Greece in the Balkans and the Middle East, something that the US Secretary of State also mentioned in his introductory remarks during the bilateral meeting. In fact, he referred, I quote, to Greece’s ‘leadership’ role.

At the same time, it is underlined that the bilateral relations between the two countries have reached a unique level, historically speaking.

The US chooses Greece as one of the few European countries in which they invest, expanding their geopolitical and strategic footprint.

At this point, I would like to emphasize that they select new locations and they don’t just maintain the existing ones.

In principle, the contractual commitment is, -I emphasize that- for a period of five years, which means that it binds both the current and the next Administration.

The US decided to invest in facilities of the Greek Armed Forces, which will be used by the Armed Forces of both countries and will remain under Greek administration, in strategic locations, such as Thrace and Crete.

And that happens in fact, just after the migration crisis of March 2020, but also the continuing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country is further shielded, while there is explicit mention of the threat of attack.

Allow me to read the exact text of the Agreement so as to avoid misinterpretations / misunderstandings, but also to emphasize its importance:

Well, in paragraph 3 of the preamble to the agreement it is explicitly stated: “Reiterating their firm determination to mutually safeguard and protect the security, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of their respective countries against actions threatening peace, including armed attack or threat of attack, and reaffirming their determination to actively and unreservedly oppose any such attempt or action and their commitment to making appropriate major efforts to prevent such course of action”.

The new agreement with the US, signed about two weeks after the agreement with France, as well as the agreement with the UAE, create a protective shield for Greece, which goes beyond commitments in multilateral frameworks.

It is obvious that Greece’s strategic allies are investing bilaterally in our country, strengthening existing commitments within NATO and the EU, thus indicating the particular importance they attach to the protection and prosperity of our country.

With regard to the agreement with France in particular, let me point out that the two agreements are complementary and not antagonistic.

They constitute milestones in Greece’s efforts for the consolidation of European, as well as Euro-Atlantic security.

Finally, I would like to point out that the list of facilities is not necessarily exhaustive, as the agreement allows, by mutual consent, for the American footprint to be expanded, including other islands, in the future.

That’s all in a nutshell concerning the MDCA.

Regarding the letter of the American Secretary of State to the Prime Minister, allow me to make a few observations.

This letter is a unilateral political commitment of the United States to our country and therefore, it carries a special weight.

First of all, as I have already mentioned, Greece is recognized as a pillar of stability and a “regional leader”. This is in quotes. It is not a sentence of mine.

At the same time, the letter confirms the excellent bilateral relations, which “reach new heights”. That’s the exact wording.

The letter underscores the US commitment to the mutual protection of Greece’s sovereignty and territorial integrity from threats or armed attack.

The relevant reference, which is also included in the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, is repeated, this time, in a unilateral political text that binds exclusively the United States.

The letter makes explicit reference to the possibility of deployment of US forces on Greek islands besides Crete, either for operational purposes or for training.

For the first time, the United States make explicit reference to the need for respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as Greece’s sovereign rights on the basis of the International Law of the Sea.

The reference to sovereign rights is an extremely significant new element.

Finally, the letter refers to the joint commitment of Greece and the United States to the principles of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and social progress, which is reflected in the renewed MDCA.

And of course, I referred only to issues that fall within the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There are many other positive elements regarding defence cooperation between the two countries, but allow me not to expand on them.

Now, I would like to comment briefly on various bilateral contacts.

The Minister’s first working meeting with his US counterpart, Antony Blinken, took place in an excellent atmosphere and lasted longer than had originally been planned.

During this meeting, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dendias, underlined the values and principles that have always governed Greek foreign policy and underscored the strengthening of relations with countries beyond the immediate neighbourhood of Greece, such as India and Australia, which, like Greece, are committed to the application of and respect for the International Law of the Sea.

Mr. Dendias also referred to the strengthening of the 3 + 1 format (Greece, Cyprus, Israel and the USA), which could be transformed into a quadrilateral cooperation scheme, and possibly a multilateral one with the inclusion of other countries in the region such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.

Mr. Dendias underlined the particularly close ties of Greece both with the USA and within NATO.

He added that the agreement with France strengthens European defence and security, and at the same time strengthens the transatlantic link through a more balanced burden-sharing, as we call it in NATO, which is a key element for the US.

The Minister underscored that Greece respects and implements its commitments to NATO, such as the amount of defence spending (over 2% of GDP). And also, another criterion that is not so well known is that 20% of defence spending should be related to the purchase of equipment. Greece will exceed this percentage with the new orders. We are already very close; I am sure we will exceed it.

The discussion then focused on developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in the Western Balkans. There was a thorough discussion and in fact the US Secretary of State took special interest in the views we had on various developments. The two ministers also discussed Libya, the cooperation with the Gulf countries and other regions.

In this context, the Minister briefed his American counterpart thoroughly on Turkey’s provocative conduct, showing him relevant maps, such as the map for the illegal and non-existent “Turkish-Libyan memorandum”, because a picture is worth a thousand words.

He underlined the threat of war that Turkey is bringing back to the fore more and more often (casus belli), as well as the illegal and non-existent “Turkish-Libyan memorandum”.

Mr. Dendias noted that apart from the fact that the aforementioned actions violate fundamental rules of International Law, they do not fall within the framework of common sense. They completely defy all logic.

Under these circumstances, the scope of understanding with Turkey, and provided that the latter does not change its attitude, remains – at best – very limited.

The Minister also referred to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leader’s intransigent stance, which does not leave much room for optimism for a solution to the Cyprus issue.

He then briefed his counterpart thoroughly about the strengthening of Greece’s ties with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the stabilizing role that Greece plays in the Western Balkans.

At that point, special reference was made to Greece’s role as an energy hub. In fact, the American side particularly emphasized the role that Alexandroupoli can play, where a gas terminal is expected to be operational soon.

In the meetings that the Minister had with US Legislators, the main topic of discussion was the particularly worrying developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and especially Turkey’s role.

Mr. Dendias gave the three of them a detailed briefing on the Turkish provocative conduct and in fact all three showed particular interest. And of course, in this context, there was a wider discussion on parliamentary cooperation.

The Minister also wrote to the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Menendez, who at the time was not in the United States.

I highlight the important role that the country’s legislative bodies play in shaping US foreign policy.

Let me remind you of the East Med Act of 2019 and the US-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act, passed, with bipartisan support, by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and currently in the House of Representatives, in the respective House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The House of Representatives also recently passed a bill on US policy in Libya, which is expected to be introduced in the Senate for a vote soon.

Allow me now to say a few words about the meetings with the Israeli and the Emirati Foreign Ministers. In particular, as far as Israel is concerned, it is noted that our relations with the country have also been taken to another level, without this of course affecting the excellent relations we have with the Arab countries.

It is noted that the aforementioned Ministers were in Washington D.C, where they jointly met with their US counterpart on the occasion of the one-year anniversary of the Abraham accords.

Both meetings confirmed the strategic nature of relations between Greece and these countries.

All developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa and multilateral cooperation schemes were examined.

Yesterday the Minister travelled to Luxembourg to attend the Foreign Affairs Council.

On the sidelines, he hosted Libyan Foreign Minister Najla El Mangoush for a working breakfast with Foreign Ministers of EU member states. Ms. El Mangoush had visited Athens about a month ago.

In this context, Mr. Dendias reiterated Greece’s firm position on the holding of the elections on December 24, as agreed, as well as on the complete withdrawal of foreign troops and mercenaries from the country.

The Minister emphasized the importance that both Greece and the European Union attach to the stability of Libya, but also of the wider region.

In this context, the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country must be ensured.

Let me remind you that regarding Greece, in addition to the regular political and economic contacts at bilateral level, including the recent visit of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Fragogiannis, the Embassy in Tripoli and the Consulate General in Benghazi have been operating for months.

Our country has also donated 200,000 vaccines to Libya to help address the coronavirus pandemic.

It is noted that yesterday’s Council was the first formal Council since last July, although a videoconference on Afghanistan was held in August, as well as the informal Gymnich meeting in Slovenia in early September, and the informal Ministerial meeting in New York.

The Council addressed various issues of Greek interest.

First of all, as HR / VP Borrell stated in yesterday’s press conference, Turkey’s behaviour creates tension in Cyprus and undermines the resumption of negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus issue. And of course, he expressed his solidarity with the EU member states of Greece and Cyprus regarding Turkish illegal activities in their respective EEZ.

In this context, it was agreed to ask the European External Action Service and the European Commission to prepare an options paper with proposed measures against Turkey, which the Member States will be called upon to decide.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dendias, fully supported his Cypriot counterpart’s intervention, who referred in detail to the Turkish unlawful conduct and stressed that the European Union should set the limits regarding the illegal and unacceptable Turkish actions.

He stressed that, as the other Member States show solidarity against the actions of Belarus, similarly there must be solidarity with Cyprus.

It is highlighted that the HR / PV Borrell’s initial proposal, which was adopted by the Council by acclamation, was supported by several Member States, which were strongly in favour, while no country opposed.

Regarding the Western Balkans, the Greek side welcomed the agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, which aims to reduce tensions in the region.

In this context, we express our full support for the work of EU Special Envoy Mr. Lajcak on the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.

The full integration of the Western Balkans remains a strategic goal, and as was made evident at the recent Summit in Slovenia, both the EU and the Western Balkans should continue their efforts in this direction.

We look forward to a strategic discussion of the EU Foreign Ministers on the Western Balkans in November.

Let me remind you that the last relevant discussion, with the presence of EU Foreign Ministers and the Foreign Ministers of Albania and North Macedonia, took place, via videoconference, last May, at a joint initiative of Greece and Romania.

Finally, allow me to say one word about the EU-Gulf relations.

Greece is clearly in favour of strengthening these relations and in this context, we underline the need to respect freedom of navigation, as well as the International Law of the Sea more generally.

Now, a few words about the Minister’s schedule.

As we speak, he is participating in the Greece-Cyprus-Egypt Trilateral Summit. Earlier, he participated in the bilateral meeting between the Prime Minister and the Egyptian President.

The Minister will then travel to Oman, where he is expected to meet tomorrow with his counterpart Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Al Busaidi.

The Minister will also meet with the Minister of the Royal Office of Oman, General Sultan bin Mohammed Al Nuamani, as well as with the Chairman of the Public Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones, Ali bin Masoud Al Sunaidy.

The talks are expected to focus on strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries, as well as on developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Gulf, and on the cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council.

During the visit, the signing of the following two Agreements has also been scheduled: A visa waiver Agreement for holders of diplomatic, service and special passports, and a Memorandum of Understanding on Political Consultations.

It is not known at the moment if joint statements to the press will follow the meetings. And today is a holiday in Oman. If something comes up, you will be informed.

On Thursday, October 21, Mr. Dendias will travel to Tripoli, Libya, at the invitation of his Libyan counterpart Ms El Mangoush, to participate at the ‘Libya Stability Initiative’, which underscores the growing importance that both Libya and other countries attach to the stabilizing and positive role that Greece plays.

This conference is a Libyan initiative, in which mainly countries neighbouring Libya, as well as the countries participating in the Berlin Process on Libya, have been invited to participate.

The Conference is expected to focus on two key areas: security and economy.

On Friday, October 22, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is expected to meet with the Speaker of the Knesset (Israeli Parliament), Michael Levy and the Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia Kakha Kuchava, who will be in Athens in the framework of the European Conference of Presidents of Parliament of the Council of Europe member states.

Next Monday and Tuesday, Mr. Dendias will travel to London, where he will meet with his new British counterpart Liz Truss.

Let me remind you that last February the Minister met with his then counterpart Dominic Raab in London, which indicates the special importance that Greece attaches to the strengthening of traditional ties with the United Kingdom in the post-Brexit era.

On Wednesday, October 27, the Minister is expected to receive his Chinese counterpart, Mr. Wang Yi.

On Friday, October 29, Mr. Dendias will receive in Athens the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Mr. Nayef bin Falah Mubarak Al-Hajraf, whom he has already met twice, last April in Riyadh, when they signed a cooperation protocol and in September in New York.

Finally, on Wednesday, November 3, he will receive the Foreign Minister of Slovenia, Mr. Anže Logar, whose country holds the Presidency of the Council of the EU.

For this reason, the next briefing will take place either on Tuesday, November 2, or on Thursday, November 4.

You will be informed in time.

Well, regarding the schedule of the Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Varvitsiotis, I would like to point out the following:

The Alternate Minister is currently participating in the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg.

On Wednesday, October 20, he will participate in an online event for the Future of Europe with the participation of Greek employees of European Institutions.

He will accompany the Prime Minister to the European Council in Brussels on Thursday and Friday, October 21 and 22.

On Monday, October 25, he will attend a Conference on Climate Change and then he will meet with Polish Secretary of State for Europe, Szymon Szynkowsky.

Finally, on Wednesday, October 27, Mr. Varvitsiotis will pay a visit to Cyprus.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fragogiannis is also participating in the Greece- Cyprus-Egypt Summit.

On Thursday, October 21 he will participate in the inaugural event of the European Conference of Presidents of Parliament of the Council of Europe member states.

On the same day he will travel to Tirana for bilateral contacts.

On Monday and Tuesday, October 25-26, he will accompany the Prime Minister on his visit to Riyadh, in the framework of the ‘Middle East Green Initiative’ Summit and the ‘Future Investment Initiative’.

As for the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Katsaniotis’ schedule, it is as follows:
Tomorrow and the day after tomorrow he will be in Istanbul on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Elevation of His All Holiness, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.

Next Monday, the Deputy Minister will be in Venice to inaugurate the International Scientific Conference “From Alexandria to Constantinople: Platonic Philosophy and Christian Theology (284 -1453).

Finally, on the National Holiday of October 28, he will participate in the Memorial Ceremony to be held in honour of the Greek soldiers who fell during the Greco-Italian War (1940-1941), to be held in Këlcyra and Bularat.

That’s all from me today. Now I am at your disposal for questions.

A warm request: please, ask one question at a time and state your name and the medium you represent, for the records we keep.

Thank you for your patience.

K. BALI: Kaki Bali from ‘AVGI’ newspaper. I want to ask you about the Borrell list, whether what was decided yesterday, the mandate given yesterday on the options, is it the same mandate that has been standing since last year, or I missed something along the way, and also whether the Greek government essentially seeks the imposition of sanctions, or considers them to be counterproductive.

A. PAPAIOANNOU: As regards the mandate. The mandate is new. It is not the options paper issued last March, if that is what you are referring to. It follows the European Council conclusions of last March and in particular the declaration issued by the 27 member states last July, following the events in Varosha. In this context, it was clearly stated that if there is a recidivism of Turkish conduct, then additional measures should be considered. Greece’s position on the EU-Turkey relationship is well known. We are maybe among the few counties that support the accession path, with the well-known conditionality and criteria, of course. This has not changed. But, having said that, if Turkish conduct continues to be what it is and, indeed, to threaten directly with its actions EU member states, we believe that this should not go unanswered.

In his introductory remarks, before the Ministers took the floor, Mr. Borrell himself said that Turkish conduct is unacceptable and that the drafting of an options paper should be initiated on the basis of last July’s declaration, which I mentioned earlier; he made a clear reference to that. Afterwards, as I have told you, Mr. Christodoulides made a thorough presentation. Of course, the Minister of Foreign Affairs supported him. Then, several member states – other than the usual [supporters], which I am not going to name – came forward and strongly supported this proposal and, like I said, there was no retort. Of course, we are waiting for the proposals by Mr. Borrell and the European Union which has a shared competence.

K. FRYSSA: Katerina Fryssa from ERT. Following up on the question of my colleague, do we have any idea of what the measures will be, that is, the additional measures of the European Union against Turkey?

A. PAPAIOANNOU: It is too early to be able to say anything at this moment. To begin with, it is not my place to go into details, as I certainly cannot preempt the proposals Mr. Borrell and the European Commission are going to submit. This is one thing. The other one I would like to point out is that the proposals will be submitted to the 27 member states which will decide unanimously. So, we are at a very early stage, therefore allow me not to go [into details]. Let us leave it there and see it when the document is presented, which we hope will be as soon as possible.

G. MELNIK: Yesterday there was a very serious statement issued by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Russia’s decision to suspend both the functioning of the Russian Permanent Mission to NATO and the activities of the NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow. The NATO Information Office in Moscow will be closed down. Can you comment on these decisions?

And the second part of the question: According to the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Ambassador of a NATO member state in Moscow can perform the function of NATO liaison with the Russian Federation. Is Greece ready to assign this function to the Ambassador of Greece in Moscow? Thanks.

A. PAPAIOANNOU: Pardon me, I didn’t quite understand the second part of the question.

G. MELNIK: According to the decision of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Ambassador of Russia in Brussels will be representing Russia to NATO. But there is no NATO Ambassador in Moscow. And Moscow has stated that the ambassador of one of the NATO member states in Moscow, to be chosen at the bloc’s discretion, could perform similar functions. Is it possible Athens could be a part of this arrangement?

A. PAPAIOANNOU: Now I see. Pardon me, but I was trying to understand, I knew about the first part of the question. I heard Mr. Lavrov’s statement that if NATO wants to contact Russia in Brussels, this will be done through the Russian Ambassador accredited to the Kingdom of Belgium, since the Russian Mission to NATO is suspending its activities.

I will answer both parts. As for the first one, Greece, both within NATO and the European Union, has always supported the dual approach regarding relations between NATO and Russia. This is what we call the dual-track approach. On the one hand, as you know, it has given its consent to the freezing of NATO-Russia cooperation, basically in all areas at working level, but of course the possibility of convening the NATO-Russia Council remains, which, if I am not mistaken, has lost some of its momentum; it has not been convened since 2019. This is the one thing. This, as is known, occurred in 2014 when Greece, along with all allies, gave its consent.

On the other hand, as we have said, we always emphasize the need to have open channels of communication and that is why we are in favour of maintaining the NATO-Russia Council, and of course the contacts (I should stress that I am talking about NATO-Russia contacts, not bilateral ones) of the NATO Secretary General with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lavrov. As far as I know, they have met several times, and if I am not mistaken, they also met on the sidelines of the last UN General Assembly. Well, our position hasn’t changed, dual approach; on the one hand restrictive measures, on the other hand maintaining the dialogue with the European Union. This answers the first part of your question.

As for the second part, you will allow me here – unless there has been a dramatic change that escapes me – what I know is that NATO had two Missions in Moscow. The one was a Mission concerning information, in fact it was called ‘NATO Information Office’ headed by a representative, who, nevertheless, was not an ambassador, s/he never even had the rank of ambassador. The other one was a Military Liaison Mission. From what I understand, they have been ordered to leave now. I heard what was said about Mr. Lavrov with regard to Brussels. I do not have any information at the moment whether NATO has requested from our country to represent it, so forgive me, I have nothing to say on the second part of the question. In the NATO context, what often happens is that the Organization asks from NATO member states to be the liaison country – ‘contact point’ is the English term we use – in non-NATO countries. This is the case with countries that have a partnership with NATO, or in Mediterranean countries, countries having Mediterranean coastlines – if I am not mistaken, Greece’s Embassy in Israel was the contact point with NATO; also, our Embassy in Egypt, previously. Now, I do not know if something similar will be sought in relation to Russia, but I tell you again that this is not a national decision, it is a decision of the Organization. Sorry for taking so long.

P. MICHOS: Good morning, Panagiotis Michos from ‘TO VIMA’ newspaper.

Given that the Libya Conference is a Libyan initiative, are there any expectations? And apart from the issue of elections and the withdrawal of troops, does Greece have any other proposals? That is, with what agenda do we go there? Will we suggest something?
Thank you very much.

A. PAPAIOANNOU: I thank you. As you know there are various frameworks. There is the Berlin Process and then there is the expanded one. As I told you last time, Greece participated, albeit as an observer, for the first time in the last ministerial meeting convened by the Ministers of Germany, Italy and France in New York. And we expect, of course, the strengthening of Greece’s presence in future initiatives, although it is not up to me to say anything more at this moment.

Now, on the Conference in Tripoli, it is a purely Libyan-owned initiative, they have invited neighbouring countries, that is what they’re mainly interested in. I do not know exactly which countries have been invited at this moment, but I think Algeria, Tunisia, Chad, Sudan, Egypt, plus the countries that participate in the Berlin Process, along with some other countries, Greece, Spain, Malta, are among the participants if I am not mistaken.

Beyond that, there are mainly two issues on the agenda. The first one is security and the other will be economic cooperation.

As regards the security part in general, our position is clear. As for economic cooperation, I would say that we are among the few countries that have invested so much in the development of relations with Libya, since the formation of the Government of National Unity last February.

And it would be enough if I just mentioned the visits to Libya – the Prime Minister travelled to Tripoli last April, a week later the Minister of Foreign Affairs went to Benghazi. I may be forgetting a few of them… If I am not mistaken Mr. Fragogiannis has travelled there two times already, the last one being ten days ago. And of course, our Embassy and our Consulate General have developed particular contacts with authorities there.

Because we believe that these two issues are interrelated. That is, stability and economic growth support each other. If you do not have stability, who will invest? And if there is no investment in order to have economic growth, how will you stabilize the country?

What is particularly important and what we support in this proposal is that the initiative is Libyan and we believe that Libya must have the ownership of this initiative. Because, in the final analysis, it is the Libyans themselves who will have to provide the solution to the issues that plague them.

Of course – and this was also something that the Minister thoroughly discussed with his various interlocutors – for us the stability of Libya is of paramount importance, both because of its proximity to Greece, this is the immediate reason, and because it concerns the overall stability in North Africa. That is to say, we should not forget that Libya’s stabilization  is helping stabilize the wider North Africa region and I would say the Sahel region, if you will allow me, while on the contrary, Libya’s destabilization carries risks of spreading throughout the region.

So, we attach primary importance to this and we will go with this agenda. Now, on specific issues, allow me here not to anticipate what the Minister himself will say on Thursday. In two days, he will tell you much more.

A. MANGIRIADIS: Apostolos Mangiriadis, from ‘SKAI’. I would like to ask, Mr. Spokesperson, if the 64th round of exploratory talks is going to be held in Athens, and when?

A. PAPAIOANNOU: I have nothing to announce at the moment. When we have something, we will announce it, as we always do, in close coordination with my respective friend and counterpart of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A. VOUDOURI: Good morning, Mr. Spokesperson. Alexandra Voudouri, from ‘Athina 9.84’ radio. Let us return to the measures we are expecting to be prepared by High Commissioner Mr. Borrell and by the Commission to be submitted to the 27 member states later. Let me rephrase the question. What measures would be satisfactory to the Greek side? Thank you very much.

A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, we do not have a punitive attitude towards anyone. Let me say this as a first remark. It is not that we want to impose measures against third countries just because we like it.
Essentially, what we want is for Turkey to stop behaving the way it does. And the possibility of taking measures is another way to send a clear message that it needs to change its attitude.
Allow me to focus on this point and less on what measures are appropriate. I repeat, the issue is not the substance of the measures, but the need for Turkey to change its conduct and realize that this conduct cannot be accepted, it is unacceptable.
This is the main issue at stake at the moment and this is the message that the Minister conveyed to his counterparts yesterday. By the same line of logic that the European Union decides to take action against Belarus, it should take action against Turkey, too, against Turkish conduct.
I say it again; these are not measures against the country. They are measures, if taken, against a specific conduct. This, after all, is stated in the conclusions of March 2021, that if there is a recidivism of Turkish conduct, then the possibility of taking new measures should return to the table.
Mr. Argyrakis, please.

TH. ARGYRAKIS: Is a meeting of Mr. Dendias with Mr. Çavuşoğlu being planned in Tripoli?
And one more question for clarification. You said that the agreement for the US military facilities has a five-year duration. The previous one of 1990 had an eight-year duration and was being renewed annually by a note verbale. How will this agreement be renewed? Is it going to be the same way as the previous one? Is there going to be a renewal for five years by a note verbale or will there be an indefinite extension, as many claim, and it will be terminated only if one of the parties withdraws two years earlier?

A. PAPAIOANNOU: Thank you very much. The answer to the first question is very short. No, there is no meeting planned. We have not requested it, nor has it been requested from us.

And I should also add, so as to be absolutely clear, that I do not know whether Mr. Çavuşoğlu will be in Tripoli. I infer Turkey has been invited, since we are talking about the states that participate in the Berlin process, and that includes Turkey. Whether Turkey will be represented at ministerial level, I do not know. And as I tell you, we have neither requested for nor were we asked for a meeting.

With regard to the MDCA, as you rightly observed, the initial duration of the 1990 agreement was eight years. And since then, it is renewed every year with an exchange of Notes Verbales. The Second Protocol of Amendment, as is the official title, provides that the Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years starting from the date on which the Second Protocol enters into force.
The Agreement will remain in force thereafter – that is stated in the Agreement – unless terminated by either party by giving written notice to the other party two years earlier, through diplomatic channels. I should add that the initial Agreement provided for a period of 17 months after the termination. Now from 17 months we go to 24. Well, that’s what I had to say about…

TH. ARGYRAKIS: Does that mean indefinitely?

A. PAPAIOANNOU: I told you exactly what is stated in the Agreement. I have nothing else to add. Well, thank you very much.

K. TSAMOURI: Hello, Mr. Spokesperson. Katerina Tsamouri from STAR Channel news. I would like to return to the Greek-US Defence Agreement and ask if there is a chance that the United States will choose Skyros as a military base in the future. Also, how do you comment on Turkey’s irritation following the Greek-US Agreement? Thanks.

A. PAPAIOANNOU: Well, thank you very much. As I said earlier, the Agreement itself provides that if the two parties agree, other locations may be added in addition to the four currently mentioned in it. That is, Volos, Litochoro – I am not saying all the names – Alexandroupoli and Souda. Now, whether there will be another location added such as Skyros, it is up to both sides. So, I cannot tell you now for sure. If both sides deem it appropriate to add more locations in the future, this will be considered by both sides. And if it is decided, then it will happen.
I will limit myself to this. I do not want to get into various speculations now. After all, things change.
Allow me to emphasize once again that we are talking about Greek facilities. That is, the US will invest essentially in Greek facilities. Why am I saying this? Because it means that every selection of location by the US comes at a cost. This cost means that the US Department of Defense, that is the Pentagon, should go to Congress and say: I want funds to invest here and there. And each location should meet certain priorities of both the US and of course, Greece.
In this context, therefore, I do not rule out at some point later to deem appropriate to invest in other locations. Where will these be? I really can’t tell you, at least for now.
Now, regarding Turkey’s reaction. Okay, I do not want to step into, so to speak, my Turkish friend and counterpart’s shoes. We followed it with particular interest. I will tell you again the reason why; because this Agreement is not directed against anyone. It does not concern any third country and we say this, we repeat it again and again. The same goes for the agreement with France.
This is the one element, which is fundamental. The second one, which emerges from the Minister’s meeting with Mr. Blinken, was that it was not Turkish-centric. On the contrary we discussed a wider range of issues – in fact the US side was particularly pleased with that. Greek foreign policy has now moved away, so to speak, from this Turkish-centric horizon that it might have had in the past. And so, this Agreement falls into this category.
Let me also point out that some of these locations are of strategic importance both to Greece but also, of course, to the United States in terms of deploying their forces on the European continent.
And what I said before is that the Americans have forces stationed in various parts of Europe but no longer invest, at least with permanent forces, in other parts of Europe, at least as far as I know.
And let me say something interesting here. Other European countries are even willing to pay the US so that US forces invest in them. But the US is diminishing its footprint on the European continent.
What we see here is a differentiation. I say again that I do not connect this with Turkey. I would say that both Greece and the USA make no such connection.
Ms. Stamouli, please.

N. STAMOULI: Nektaria Stamouli from the ATHENS NEWS AGENCY.
I’d like to clarify something. If I understood correctly, you said that Borrell’s previous options paper has nothing to do with this one? Why was it decided to abandon the former? And what more can we expect from this one?

A. PAPAIOANNOU: Pardon me, I did not say that the previous one was abandoned. The previous options paper was much broader because it had two parts – one was the positive, let’s say, the other one was less positive… It was a document that was presented at the European Council of March 2021.
This, of course, does not mean that the European Commission and the European External Action Service cannot draw on it to produce the options paper. It is not that one is abandoned. We did not put them in the drawer. All these things are, so to speak, living documents.
But this was a paper that was requested, if I am not mistaken, by the European Council of December 2020 and presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers in March, in view of the European Council that took place a few days later by videoconference, if I am not mistaken.
So, it is not that one excludes the other. But what Borrell said was that after the declaration we made on behalf of the 27 last July, we will now have to consider possible action that needs to be taken. He said this and he repeated it in the press conference he gave yesterday after the Council.

B. AGROLABOS: Mr. Spokesperson, Agrolabos from the “EFIMERIDA TON SINTAKTON” newspaper.
Was the holding of elections discussed at the meeting with Mangoush in Luxembourg, and which Organization could be given observer status in the general elections, if and when they take place? If they do not, given that the transitional government will carry on – and I do not know for how much longer it can remain transitional – does Greece intend to reinvigorate the discussion with Libya on the EEZ? Thanks.

A. PAPAIOANNOU: First of all, regarding the second question let me say that it is a hypothetical one. What we are saying is that the elections have been decided, not by us, but by them. There are relevant decisions on holding the elections on December 24 and we support this.
What was discussed yesterday in Luxembourg and will be discussed on Thursday in Tripoli is how the international community will be able to support Libya’s efforts to prepare for these elections.
Now, who will be able to help or be an observer? First of all, definitely the United Nations and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This is the one actor. Beyond that, whether the European Union or the OSCE, or I do not know which other organization, will be asked to send observers, this is a purely hypothetical question, which is for the Libyan side to decide. Because, of course, if the Libyan side does not ask for it, then there is no such question.
Of course, we believe that we, the European Union, at least- I am sure of it-will respond positively, in the sense that of course we are doing everything we can so that free elections will be held on the scheduled date.