This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM recorded a lower number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous day. It conducted further crater analysis related to the shelling in Olenivka. The Mission observed presence of weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works. The SMM observed long queues at checkpoints near the contact line. It observed a protest in Odessa.
The SMM recorded a lower number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous day. In the evening hours of 28 April, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position. Positioned at Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 52 undetermined explosions, and 32 explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire, 29 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and 123 single shots of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 1-7km and from west to north of its position.
In the evening hours of 28 April, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard at least 15 explosions (five outgoing and ten incoming) assessed as caused by 73mm cannon (BMP-1), recoilless-gun (SPG-9) and rocket-propelled grenade-launcher (RPG-7) fire, 41 explosions (20 outgoing and 21 incoming) of automatic-grenade-launcher fire, and at least 38 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and intermittent shots of small-arms fire 2-6km south-south-east of its position.
In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a low number of ceasefire violations. In the evening hours of 28 April, whilst in “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 50-60 single shots of small-arms fire, 1.5-2km west of its position. On 29 April, whilst near Vrubiskyi (“LPR”-controlled, 22km south-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard and saw around 32 explosions, assessed as mortar rounds outgoing at a location 3km south west of its position, and subsequently heard and saw 32 explosions assessed as rounds impacting at a training area in “LPR”-controlled Myrne, (31km south-west of Luhansk), outside the security zone.
The SMM conducted further crater analysis following the fatal shelling incident in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on 27 April (see SMM Spot Report 28 April 2016). The SMM further analysed five craters in proximity to the clinic. The SMM determined the origin of the shelling (south-west and west-south-west) for the five craters, four of which were assessed as caused by 122mm artillery and the fifth by 152mm artillery. The closest crater to the clinic was 50m east of its entrance. The SMM observed some damage to the eastern walls of the clinic building caused by shrapnel, and minor damages to its roof caused by a blast wave. The SMM observed a storage building 100m south of the clinic which had been completely destroyed by a direct impact. Apart from a security guard, the clinic was empty at the time of the shelling, according to the deputy chief doctor. Whilst in Olenivka, the SMM observed at least two small arms firing positions, less than 500m from the clinic and less than 400m from where four civilians were killed by the shelling on 27 April. Also less than 500m from the clinic and 200m from the place of the incident, the SMM observed several residential houses, blocked by ammunition boxes (marked 120mm mortar) and other materials, such as sandbags, assessed as quarters of armed “DPR” members. The SMM observed four heavily armed “DPR” members guarding one of the buildings.
The SMM followed up on alleged shelling on 26 April near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk). In the vicinity of the “LPR”-controlled checkpoint at the bridge, the SMM observed that a tree on the south-western side of the bridge had been hit. The impact was fresh and SMM assessed that it had been caused by fire from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed impacts and remnants, as well as a mortar tail section stuck in the north-facing side of a hill nearby.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and observed that three anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm) were missing, as they have been since 29 December 2015.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed seven tanks (T-72) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city.
Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed 12 tanks at a training ground in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: seven MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city.
The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.
In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed ten MLRS (BM-27 Uragan), 12 anti-tank guns (2A29/MT Rapira, 100mm) and four Addendum-regulated mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm).
Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed: a stationary anti-aircraft system (SA-8) near government-controlled Novovasylivka (59km north-west of Donetsk); five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka.
The SMM continued to observe the marking of mined areas and presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM observed six billboards providing information on mines (three on each side of the road), within approximately 2km, between two government-controlled checkpoints near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM observed an improvised 20 by 40cm mine hazard sign written in black letters on a wooden stick 1km north-west of government-controlled Nadezhdynka (63km north-west of Donetsk).
The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned both in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) and in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk) between 09:10 and 12:55, the SMM observed the adherence to the ceasefire and the repair works of three bank filtration wells, whereby the pipelines, transformer and valves of the wells were replaced.
The SMM continued to monitor long queues at entry-exit checkpoints near the contact line. At a checkpoint in government-controlled Marinka the SMM observed several angry civilians who said that they had been waiting in queue all day. Some of them started to hit and kick the SMM vehicles, causing light scratches to one vehicle. At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol), a group of 16 civilians (aged 35-40, males and females) said they had been waiting for six hours. They feared that the slow crossing procedures would prevent them from returning to their homes or join their families in time for the forthcoming holidays.
The SMM monitored border areas in government- and non-government-controlled areas. At the government-controlled Milove (107km north of Luhansk) border crossing point, the SMM observed a queue of around 50 civilian vehicles waiting to cross into the Russian Federation, as well as around 15-20 pedestrians. At the border crossing point in Marynivka (“DPR-controlled, 78km east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 33 civilian vehicles, five commercial trucks (one loaded with coal) and two passenger buses waiting to cross into the Russian Federation (mostly with Ukrainian license plates except for three cars with Russian licence plates). At the border crossing point in Uspenka (“DPR-controlled, 73km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 42 cars waiting to cross into the Russian Federation (all with Ukrainian license plates except for four with Russian licence plates). During one hour, the SMM also observed some 15 pedestrians crossing from the Russian Federation into Ukraine.
The SMM met with the head of the state penitentiary service department for Donetsk region who confirmed that 20 prisoners (18 males and two females) were transferred from facilities in non-government controlled areas to Mariupol on 20 April, where they will serve the remainder of their sentences. He stated that a total of 112 prisoners, all convicted by Ukrainian courts prior to or during the initial stages of the conflict, had been transferred from areas not under government control, following requests made by their relatives to the Ukrainian Ombudsman.
In Odessa, the SMM monitored the 17th consecutive day of a protest aimed at demanding the resignation of the mayor. The SMM observed 10 people (aged 30-70, three females) at the campsite in front of the city hall. Three protestors at the camp informed the SMM about an airsoft grenade thrown 65m away from the campsite in the early morning hours. The SMM visited the site, but saw no traces of an explosion. A spokesperson of the police regional headquarters informed the SMM that at 02:00 the police found an unexploded airsoft grenade near the city hall. The spokesperson added that no investigation was opened in connection with the incident.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi, Dnepropetrovsk and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Besides to the abovementioned general restrictions, the SMM was not subject to any specific restriction to its freedom of movement.
 Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.